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Abstract   Trade sanctions are used to influence the long-run management of an
ecological system in another country, trying to secure a large predator stock by
using sanctions on the exports of the products from the predator or the prey.
This corresponds to U.S. sanctions on Norwegian fish exports aiming to prevent
or reduce harvesting of Minke whales. Threats of sanctions influence long-run
equilibrium, but do not secure increased stocks and decreased harvesting. The
outcome depends on the bioeconomic interaction between the species, and the
managerial system in the Target country. It is neither obvious that the sanctions
are credible, nor that the Sender will succeed. The interaction between the spe-
cies is crucial for evaluating the effects of the sanctions.
Key words   Economic sanctions, marine mammals, multispecies marine man-
agement.
Introduction
The management of ecological systems will often be of international interest, even
when they are managed domestically. This is the basis for international negotiations
and multilateral agreements. There are a large number of such problems in resource
management, including externalities in the extraction or harvesting, and the exist-
ence of public goods. The atmosphere, the existence of species, and biodiversity are
all international public goods; and there is a need for second-best policies to handle
the noncooperative situation if international agreements are not reached.
Policy interventions to protect one species influence the whole ecological sys-
tem of interacting species. In the short-run it is reasonable to exclude such effects,
but they must be considered in the long-run management. The International Conven-
tion on Trade in Endangered Species (CITES) is a multilateral agreement which uses
trade bans as a main measure to protect species. The U.S. Marine Mammal Protec-
tion Act goes even further, by including the possibility of U.S. unilateral use of trade
sanctions on imports of all sea products to influence other countries to adopt U.S.
policy of protection of marine mammals (Porter and Brown 1996). Here trade sanc-
tions on the prey are used to influence the management of the predators within the
same ecological systems.
This policy option has been brought into the discussion on the management of
the Northeast Atlantic Minke whale.1 Norway has insisted on starting sustainable
harvesting of this resource, and wants to remove the Minke whale from the CITES
trade ban. The U.S. considered using trade sanctions on Norwegian sea products—
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including fish from the Barents Sea—as a pressure to stop Norwegian whaling. In
this case, there are no exports of whale products, but there are exports of products from
the other species within the same marine ecosystem. In the short-run, trade sanctions
will only decrease the profits in the fisheries. However, in the long-run, sanctions will
change the profitability and the equilibrium stocks for all species. We shall focus on this
interaction, and how international trade interventions influence the long-run stocks of
marine mammals—like the seal species and different whale species.
The discussion is limited to two species because the main purpose is to analyze
the principles of interaction. We concentrate on a predator-prey relationship, while
Schulz (1997a) also analyzes a system of competing species. It is usually possible to
introduce international pressure directly on the management of the actual species.
This is the case for seals where the products are mainly for export. However, in
some cases, such as the Norwegian Minke whale, the products are sold domestically
and trade policy only works through other exports like fish products. Flaaten (1988,
1989) has studied harvesting of predator-prey ecosystems. The present analysis
builds on his work. However, in the comparative statics of the equilibrium solution
he ignores some of the interspecies effects. Hence, our analysis reaches different,
and sometimes opposite conclusions to his studies. In the model, the ecological sys-
tem is harvested by national fishermen who are using the natural resource as a
source for extraction of an economic rent. The national multispecies management is
under pressure from another nation, which has objections to the management. Sanc-
tions are then used to enforce the policy abroad.
The organization of the paper is as follows. We first give a short background on
economic sanctions, we then build a traditional model for long-run development of a
marine predator-prey ecological system. The bioeconomic system is connected with
a national economic management system, and the products are tradables internation-
ally. Starting from this, we analyze how economic sanctions influence the long-run
stocks in the ecological system. A policy discussion closes the paper. Some of the
technical analysis is placed in the appendix.
Background on Sanctions
Some nations are willing to use resources to protect nature abroad, and trade sanc-
tions are among the measures used for this. In some cases trade policy is used to
regulate international flows of commodities or pollution. We concentrate on situa-
tions where trade sanctions are measures to influence the stocks abroad, while the
trade flows as such are of minor interest. Hufbauer, Schott, and Kimberly (1990)
give a short general bibliography of economic sanctions, Schulz (1996) discusses
the one-species case, and Schulz (1997b) discusses the rationality of sanctions.
Trade sanctions are measures for both expressive and instrumental goals
(Galtung 1967). We concentrate on the latter, by analyzing restrictions on imports as
a measure to influence marine management in the Target country. The experiences
from economic sanctions lead to the conclusion that trade sanctions are not prohibi-
tive, but that they add costs for the Target, like a special tax on exports from the Tar-
get. We assume that sanctions work like a negative demand shift in the Sender coun-
try, and we assume throughout the analysis that this results in a lower producer price
for the sanctioned products from the Target country.
We do not specify the strength of the demand for protection. A possible way is
to assume that a low level will lead to consumer boycotts, a higher level to govern-
mental sanctions on imports of sea products, and a still higher level will lead to a
general ban on trade. The effects of the sanctions depend heavily on the market con-
ditions. In a market with free competition and homogeneous products, a bilateralTrade Sanctions and Marine Mammals 161
sanction will have no effect. In markets with imperfect competition, the effects of
sanctions depend on the specified situation in production, demand, and competition
(Lundborg 1987; Moe 1993; and Schulz 1997b).
The Sender country wants to ‘protect’ the marine mammal, while this species is
part of the marine ecosystem in the Target country. We model this as a demand for
increased stock of the marine mammal.2 The Target country is supposed to have a
joint management regime of the marine mammal and the fish stock. Products from
both species are tradables, and we assume net exports from the Target country of
both (with no sanctions).
The short-run effects of sanctions are obvious. A lower producer price makes
harvesting less profitable, and this decreases the harvesting rate (Barbier et al.
1990). We concentrate on the effects on the stock size and on the ecological system
which occur only in the long-run. As for marine mammals, the long-run equilibrium
is reached after decades. However, sanctions, or threats of sanctions, will influence
the expected long-run producer price. We also investigate how a lower rate of dis-
count, or an increased nonconsumptive stock value of the marine mammal, will in-
fluence the long-run stock.
The Model
We use a standard bioeconomic model (Clark 1976), adding a specification of the
predator-prey relationship following Flaaten (1989). The predator-prey interaction
has also been studied in Ströbele and Wacker (1995). Flaaten and Stollery (1996) re-
fer to the diet of the Minke whale as consisting mainly of herring, krill, capelin, and
cod.
Xi(t) is the normalized biomass stock of species i, 0 ≤  Xi ≤  1, let-
ting all stocks vary from 0 to 1 (the carrying capacity of the
normalized stock). We set X1 for the fish (prey) stock, and X2
for the marine mammal (predator) stock.
ri is the intrinsic growth rate of species i
yi(t) is the harvest rate for species i
ν is the normalized predation coefficient
We analyze only the biomass of the species, and for convenience we drop the function
symbols for t. Partial derivatives are denoted by a subscript, ∂ u/∂ v = uv, and ∂ u/∂ Xi = ui.
Following Flaaten (1989), we specify a two-species biological interaction as
dX1/dt = F(X1, X2) = r1X1(1 – X1) – ϕ X1X2 = r1X1(1 – X1 – ν X2) (1)
dX2/dt = G(X1, X2) = r2X2(1 – X2/X1). (2)
The predation coefficient ϕ  specifies the reduction in the growth rate of the prey per unit
of the predator. The carrying capacity of the predator is a function of the prey stock, nor-
malized to equal 1, and the carrying capacity of the prey with no predation pressure is
also 1. To simplify we introduce ν  = ϕ /r1 as the normalized predation coefficient.
We assume throughout the analysis, independent fisheries of each species, and
the unit profit, bi = bi(Xi, pi), is assumed to be an increasing function of the price and
the stock of the species. The profit from harvesting species i, π i, is
2 The demand for protection may include both an existence value, a nonconsumptive value of the stock,
and a demand for stopping the harvesting.Schulz 162
π i = bi(pi, Xi) yi,    bip > 0, bix ≥  0,    bipx = 0, i = 1, 2. (3)
We specify a Schaefer production function in each fishery, with the harvest rate pro-
portional with both the stock and the harvesting effort
yi = riHiXi,    i = 1, 2. (4)
The term (riHi) is the constant effort per unit time, with Hi scaled so that Hi = 1 corre-
sponds to a constant catchability coefficient equal to ri. For a constant product price
pi and constant cost ai per unit effort, we find by using the equations (3) and (4)
bi(Xi, pi) = pi – ai/Xi,    i = 1, 2. (5)
Using the equations (1), (2), and (4) we have the growth rates with harvesting
dX1/dt = F(X1, X2) – y1 = r1X1(1 – X1 – ν X2) – y1 = r1X1(1 – H1 – X1 – ν X2) (6)
  if dX1/dt = 0 ⇒  F(X1, X2) = y1 =  r1H1X1
dX2/dt = G(X1, X2) – y2 = r2X2(1 – X2/X1) – y2 = r2X2(1 – H2 – X2/X1) (7)
  if dX2/dt = 0 ⇒  G(X1, X2) = y2 =  r2H2X2
where F(.) and G(.) indicate the biological growth of the species, giving the
isoclines for dXi/dt = 0 as:
X2 = (1/ν )(1 – H1 – X1) (8)
X2 = (1 – H2)X1. (9)
We assume that a positive equilibrium exists,3 and it is found at the intersection of
the isoclines, giving
X H
1  = (1 – H1)/[1 + ν (1 – H2)] (10)
X H
2  = (1 – H1)(1 – H2)/[1 + ν (1 – H2)]. (11)
Equations (10) and (11) imply that there will only exist a positive equilibrium for
both stocks for H1 < 1. The solution is illustrated in figure 1. Quantities  X1
#,  X1
# are
the long-run equilibrium stocks without harvesting, and  X H
1 ,  X H
2  are the long-run
equilibrium stocks with the harvesting efforts H1 and H2. The triangle ABC in figure
1 gives the sustainable yield area for the two-species. Any combination of stocks outside
the triangle will give a decrease in one or both stocks until they are within the triangle.
The predator will only survive if also H2 < 1. Both stocks will increase with decreas-
ing H1. If H2 decreases (decreasing fishing pressure on the predator) the stock of the
predator will increase and the equilibrium stock of the prey will decrease.
The open access management has an incentive to increase the harvesting effort
until π i = 0. The open access equilibrium stocks are independent of the ecological
3 It is quite possible that the stocks will have cyclical variations. If so, the interpretation of  Xi
H is the
point which the stocks are fluctuating around. Our purpose is to discuss how sanctions work, and the
dynamic behavior of the model. The conditions for stable equilibria are not discussed. We assume that
the equilibria are stable, and the conditions for this are discussed by Flaaten (1989).Trade Sanctions and Marine Mammals 163
interaction between the species, due to the assumption of independent fisheries. In
the Schaefer case the open access equilibrium stocks must satisfy
Xi
∞  = ai/pi,    H1
∞  = 1 – a1/p1 – ν a2/p2,    H2
∞  = 1 – a2p1/(a1p2),   i = 1, 2. (12)
Optimal Management
In the optimal management regime, the objective of the social manager is to maxi-
mize the present value of the joint rent from the two resources, denoting δ  for the
social rate of discount. We add a nonconsumptive value of the predator stock, RX2,
R ≥  0, and we assume that the Sender country sets R > 0, while the Target country
only values the harvest, R = 0. The total profit from the harvesting is π  = π 1 + π 2.
The maximization problem is now
max [ ( , ) ( , ) ] – – PV RX e dt b X p y b X p y RX e dt t t == + +  
∞∞
∫∫ [+  ] π δ δ
2
0
111 1 2222 2
0
(13)
with the catch or efforts as controls. The effects of a shift in the marginal
nonconsumptive value of the stock are demonstrated as ∂ Xi/∂ R. The restrictions for
the maximization problem are the equations (6) and (7).
The solution to equation (13), substituting for the specified growth functions in
equations (6) and (7), and the profit functions (5), gives the equations (14) – (17) as
necessary conditions for long-run equilibrium stock levels  X1
* and  X2
*, denoting π i =
∂π /∂ Xi (see appendix).
π 1 = δ b1( X1
*, p1) ⇔  b1(X1
*, p1)F1 + b2( X2
*, p2)G1  + b1x( X1
*, p1)F(.) = δ b1(X1
*, p1) (14)
⇒  p1r1(1 – 2 X1
* – ν X2
*) + (p2 – a2/X2
*)r2 X2
2 * /X1
2 *  + a1r1 = (p1 – a1/X1
*)δ
Figure 1.  Phase Diagram for the Predator-Prey Model (Flaaten 1989)Schulz 164
π 2 = δ b2(X2
*, p2) ⇔  b2(X2
*, p2)G2 + b1(X1
*, p1)F2 + b2x (X2
*, p2)G(.) + R = δ b2(X2
*, p2) (15)
⇒  p2r2(1 – 2 2 X*/X1
*) – (p1 – a1/X1
*)ν rX 11
* + a2r2/X1




*) = y1 ⇔   rX 11
*(1 –  X1
* – vX2
*) = y1 or H1 = 1 –  X1




*) = y2 ⇔   rX 22
*(1 –  X2
*/X1
*) = y2 or H2 = 1 –  X2
*/X1
*. (17)
The equations (14) and (15) demonstrate that there is a joint management of both
species simultaneously. In optimum, the prey stock will always be larger than the
open access level, but the predator stock might be lower than the open access level,
(see Flaaten 1989; and Clark 1976). We see from equation (15) that setting R > 0 is
similar to managing the predator stock with a lower rate of discount than for the
prey. If so, the predator stock must be larger than the optimal one with R = 0. Both
stocks are evaluated to the return from other investment options, δ .
If the two stocks are managed independently and optimally, the prey stock will
be lower than the joint optimal one (ignoring the positive effect of the prey stock to
the growth of the predator) (Ströbele and Wacker 1995). However, the predator
stock may be larger or smaller depending on the effects of transformation of the na-
ture assets from prey to predator under multispecies management.
Four factors affect the relative distribution of the nature asset on the predator
and the prey stocks: the predation costs from the predator stock, the rent from har-
vesting the stocks, the unit harvesting cost functions, and the nonconsumptive value
of the stocks. The predation effect gives an economic incentive for depleting the
stock. If R = 0, b2 ≤  0, b2X = 0, it is economically rationale to make the predator ex-
tinct. A positive nonconsumptive value of the predator is enough to protect the stock
as long as this effect on the margin outweighs the predation costs. The effect of the
resource rent may be seen partially by setting b2 > 0, b2X = 0, R = 0. If so, we see
from equation (15) that (δ  – G2) = (b1/b2)F2 = –ν r1X1b1/b2 < 0, pushing the predator
stock to a lower size than the single species management due to the predation costs.
However, a positive b2X makes in optimum (δ  – G2) = (b1/b2)F2 + (b2X/b2)G(.) + R/b2,
and it is possible with a positive optimal predator stock with positive, but even un-
profitable, harvesting. The increased unit harvesting costs for a small predator stock
protects the stock against extinction in the Schaefer case.
Copes (1970) and Clark (1976) conclude that the long-run supply curve in a
search fishery may be backward bending. A negative shift in demand may increase
the equilibrium quantity, but the equilibrium price will decrease. This is true both in
an open access fishery, and in an optimally managed one.
The open access solution and the optimal solution without sanctions are two bench-
marks for the analysis of sanctions. Now we use a comparative static technique to com-
pare the changes in the long-run equilibrium solutions under the threat of sanctions.
How Sanctions Work in the Long-Run
Let sanctions make an exogenous marginal negative shift in the price of one prod-
uct.4 We concentrate on the Schaefer case, and we study the effects on the long-run
4 It is not obvious that this is the case. If, for instance, the manager of the resources faces a downward
sloping demand curve for products from the sanctioned species, and sanctions produce a negative shift
in the demand for these products, this will also influence the supply curve for both species. The final
outcomes for the long-run prices are not obvious.Trade Sanctions and Marine Mammals 165
equilibrium stock levels, while the long-run harvesting and profit are both functions
of the stock. We assume positive equilibrium stocks and harvesting rates throughout
the paper, and concentrate on independent fisheries of the two-species—this is the
case for fisheries and harvesting of marine mammals.
Under an open access regime we find the long-run effect of a price shift in
equation (18) from the partial differentiation of equation (12), and we see that the
long-run stock of the sanctioned species will increase, while the effort decreases,
and the harvest rate yi may increase. The sanction has no effect on the economic
rent, since it is totally dissipated anyway. As for the other species, the stock size is
unchanged.
∂ ∞ Xi /∂ pi = –ai/pi
2  < 0, ∂ H1/∂ p1 = a1/p1
2  > 0, (18)
∂ H2/∂ p2 = a2p1/(a1 p2
2 ) > 0; ∂ ∞ Xi /∂ pj = 0,
∂ H1/∂ p2 = ν a2/p2
2  > 0, ∂ H2/∂ p1 = – a2 /(a1p2 ) < 0,   i ≠  j.
These results are illustrated in the phase diagram in figure 2. The point A represents
the long-run equilibrium stock mix with no sanctions, while E denotes the stocks
with sanctions on the predator, and C denotes the stocks with sanctions on the prey.
The harvesting effort of each species is illustrated with the lines  H1
∞  and  H2
∞  in the
figure. Sanctions on the predator decrease the harvesting effort in both fisheries,
while sanctions on the prey decrease the effort in the prey fishery, but the effort in
the predator fishery increases. The effects on the harvest rates are ambiguous. The
economic interpretation of these results is straightforward. Sanctions on the predator
make this fishery less profitable, and the stock increases to obtain the zero profit
situation. The increased predator stock makes the predation pressure on the prey
larger—resulting in a lower profitability and a lower effort in the prey fishery as
well. The increased prey stock following from sanctions on the prey increases the
growth and the profitability in the predator fishery. Hence the open access effort in-
creases. The situation with no harvesting of the predator is denoted B in figure 2.
Compared with the presanction situation, this gives decreased effort in the fishery of
the prey. Sanctions on the prey may lead to even lower effort in the prey fishery.
CITES uses trade bans on single species for protection in a multispecies situa-
tion. Our analysis demonstrates that this increases the sanctioned stock under open
access and independent harvesting.
In the optimal management case, it is a well known textbook result for the one-
species case when there is a stable positive equilibrium stock, this stock increases
when the producer price decreases, but the catch may either increase or decrease
(Clark 1976). Hence, sanctions increase the stock, but do not necessarily decrease
the catch. For an optimal management regime, the sanctions decrease the resource
rent of the Target country. In a predator-prey system, sanctions on the prey should
intuitively increase the supply of food for the predator and add to that stock as well;
while sanctions on the predator should intuitively decrease the prey stock due to in-
creased predation pressure. However, these conclusions are not generally valid for
the two species case. The effects of sanctions depend on both the biological and the
economic interaction and of the management system, and we must consider this a
joint management of two interacting nature assets. Flaaten (1988, 1989) argues that
∂ Xi
*/∂ pi < 0, while ∂ Xi
*/∂ pj > 0 for i ≠  j, b2(X2) << 0. However, Flaaten (1991) con-
cludes that these results are incorrect, but the effects are not reassessed. We find
these effects by differentiation of the system of equations (14) and (15), as demon-
strated in the appendix.Schulz 166
∂ X2
*/∂ p2 = {1/ D }{π 21G1 + (π 11 – δ b1x)(δ  – G2)} (19)
 = {1/ D }{(rX 22
2 * /X1
2 * )[(rX 22
*/X1
2 * )(2p2 – a2/X2
*) – p1r1ν ]
–[δ  – r2(1 – 2 2 X*/X1
*)][2p1r1 + (p2 – a2/X2
*) rX 22
2 * /X1
3 *  + δ a1/X1
2 * ]}
  ∂ X1
*/∂ p2 = {1/ D }{–(rX 22
2 * /X1
2 * )(π 22 – δ b2X) – π 12[δ  – r2(1 – 2 2 X*/X1
*)]}   (20)
∂ X2
*/∂ p1 = {1/ D }{–π 21(δ  – F1) – (π 11 – δ b1x)F2} = {1/ D } (21)
·{–[δ  – r1(1 – 2 1 X* –  ν X2
*)]p1r1[β (2 2 X* –  X2
∞ )/(X1
*)2 – ν ] + (π 11 – δ b1x) ν rX 11
*}
∂ X1
*/∂ p1 = {1/ D }{[δ  – r1(1 – 2 1 X* – ν X2
*)](π 22 – δ b2X) (22)
– ν rX 1
2
1
*p1 [β ( 2 2 X* –  X2
∞ )/(X1
*)2 – ν ]}
where β  = p2r2/p1r1, and we denote π i = ∂π /∂ Xi, π ji = π ij = ∂ 2π /∂ Xi∂ Xj, bi = (pi – ai/Xi),
i, j = 1, 2, and we have substituted for ∂π i/∂ p1 = Fi, ∂π i/∂ p2 = Gi. In equilibrium
π ii < 0, |D| > 0, due to the conditions for maximum (Flaaten 1988). The sign of the
equations (19) – (22) are all ambiguous, and the specification of the functions does
not make the interpretation of the effects any easier. The reason for the ambiguous ef-
fects of price shifts is that the sanctions influence both the value of each stock and the
economic effect of the predation. Since the stocks are managed jointly, the optimal mix
of the natural assets may change in different directions when the value of one asset
is changed. For our discussion we must concentrate on whether a lower price in-
creases the long-run stock of the marine mammal. If so, the sanctions work. If the
lower price triggers a lower optimal stock, sanctions work opposite of their inten-
Figure 2.  Long-Run Equilibrium for a Predator-Prey Model
with Open Access Fisheries and SanctionsTrade Sanctions and Marine Mammals 167
tion.
First, we found above that if R = 0, b2X = 0, a nonpositive unit profit from har-
vesting the predator, b2 ≤  0, makes it profitable to make the predator extinct. For
schooling stocks b2X is close to or equal to zero. Hence, sanctions on a schooling
predator stock may be a threat to the species in such cases, unless R is large for the
manager.
The effect on the predator stock from sanctions on its products, ∂ X2
*/∂ p2, is dem-
onstrated in equation (19). We have G1 = r2 X2
2 * /X1
2 *  > 0, G2 = r2(1 – 2 2 X*/X1
*), and
(π 11 – δ b1x ) < 0 due to the second order conditions for maximum, | D|  > 0. The term
π 21 = –p1ν r1 + (rX 22
*/X1
2 * )(2p2 – a2/ X2
*). The sign of π 21 is ambiguous, and so is the
sign of equation (19), quite contrary to economic intuition. However, ∂ X2
*/∂ p2 < 0 if
π 21 < –(π 11 – δ b1x)(δ  – G2)/G1 = Ω . Since G1 > 0, (δ  – G2) decides the sign of Ω . An
interpretation of (δ  – G2) is as follows. We know from equation (15) that in optimum
(δ  – G2)b2 =  b1XF2 + b2XG(.) + R, biX > 0, F2 = –ν r1X1
* < 0, R ≥  0. The term b1XF2 is
the marginal economic costs of predation, while b2XG(.) is the effect of unit harvest-
ing costs decreasing with the stock size, and R is the marginal nonconsumptive
value of the stock. For positive profit in the predator harvesting, b2 > 0, we see that
(δ  – G2) < 0 as long as the predation effect dominates, or else (δ  – G2) ≥  0. If (δ  –
G2) < 0 in optimum,  X2
* is smaller than the optimal stock in a single species man-
agement with no stock-dependent costs, and we say that the predator is an economic
nuisance in the sense that the predation costs dominate the solution.5 We denote (δ  –
G2) ≥  0 as the normal situation.
The economic interpretation of π 21 < 0 is that the marginal effect on the profit
from an increase in one of the stocks decreases with the size of the other stock. If so, we
say that the stocks are marginal economic substitutes. If the predator is not a nuisance,
and the stocks are marginal economic substitutes, we always have ∂ X2
*/∂ p2 < 0. If π 21
> 0 we say that the stocks are marginal economic complements. If so, and when the
predator is an economic nuisance, then ∂ X2
*/∂ p2 > 0. Otherwise the two effects still
make the sign of the effect of a price shift ambiguous. This demonstrates that the
use of trade sanctions to influence the management of predators may be counterpro-
ductive. We conclude that if the sanctions make the predator less profitable, it is in
some cases optimal to keep more of the natural asset as prey biomass, and decrease
the predator stock.
The equation (21) demonstrates the effect on the predator stock from sanctions
on products from the prey, ∂ X2
*/∂ p1. The sign of equation (21) is also ambiguous, but
the last term is always negative. The first term is always negative if π 21 and (δ  – F1)
have the same sign. If so, ∂ X2
*/∂ p1 < 0 and sanctions on the prey always increase the
predator stock. For small prey stocks (δ  – F1) < 0, and sanctions always work if the
species are marginal economic substitutes. For large optimal prey stocks, sanctions
always work if the stocks are marginal economic complements. We see from equa-
tion (14) that always (δ  – F1) > 0 if b2 > 0, b1X ≥  0. Formally, ∂ X2
*/∂ p1 < 0 if – π 21(δ  –
F1) < – (π 11 – δ b1x)ν r1X1
*. We observe from the equations (19) and (21) that Fi ≠  0
and Gi ≠  0 are the basic effects leading to the ambiguous results of sanctions. Hence,
our conclusions build on the basic biological interaction of the species.
The phase diagram in figure 3 illustrates effects on the predator stock from
sanctions on the prey (see discussion in the appendix). The optimal stock combina-
tion must yield a positive joint profit and X1 ≥   X1
∞  (Flaaten 1989). Hence, the stock
combination must be inside the area of the straight lines EGCB plus the dotted line
EB. The sanctions only decrease the predator stock for optimal equilibria close to
5 Economic nuisance may also be defined otherwise—for example if b2(X2
*, p2) < 0. Flaaten (1989) uses
b2(X2
*, p2) << 0.Schulz 168
the open access solution, or with a combination of a large optimal prey stock and a
small predator stock in the optimal equilibrium. The first situation may occur if both
stocks are valuable, and the predation pressure makes it optimal to deplete the
predator stock close to, or beyond, the open access solution. The second situation
may occur for a combination of a small value of the prey and a large predation ef-
fect. It is possible to have a situation where sanctions on the prey decrease the
predator stock even when b2(X2
*, p2) > 0.
Other Regimes:  Constant Prey Stock or Constant Effort in the Prey Fisheries
The optimal management regime assumes a rational manager who maximizes the
present value of the rent. In the real world there usually exist constraints to this
maximization problem. We shall investigate two other regimes: Management with
constant prey stock and management with constant efforts in the prey fisheries. For
convenience, we set R = 0.
In the Barents Sea there is a negotiated joint fisheries management of Russia
and Norway. The fishing quotas are set each year for the main fish stocks. This may
be done to obtain some long-run level of biomass. A constant part of the stock is
then left for harvesting to each country. If so, we may model this as a management
policy with a constant fish stock. The marine mammals are assumed left for optimal
management within each country.
The case with constant fish stock illustrates a situation like the above, where the
national government through some other reasons decides a benchmark for long-run
Figure 3.  Stock Combinations Where Sanctions on Prey Decrease the Predator Stock
The shaded areas I and II illustrate stock combinations where ∂ X2/∂ p1 > 0. The
shade bordered area III illustrates stock combinations where ∂ X2/∂ p1 < 0. Together
they include the possible sustainable stock combinations with positive joint rent.Trade Sanctions and Marine Mammals 169
fish stock. The case with constant effort in the fishery illustrates a situation with
strong pressure on the government from the fishermen, or a situation where the gov-
ernment uses the fishery in regional employment policy, while the marine mammals
are left for maximizing the rent.6 For both cases, we want to find the effects of sanc-
tions on exports from one of the stocks. The management with constant stock or
constant harvesting efforts are also discussed by Flaaten and Stollery (1996).
The constant fish stock situation is modeled by setting X1 =  X1
0, R = 0, in the
general model. If so, and assuming positive profit from the X1 fisheries and positive




0 – 2p2r2 X2
*/X1
0 =  δ (p2 – a2/X2
*) + ν r1(p1X1
0 – a1). (23)
The predator stock is managed like a single species management, but with a larger
discount rate. The last term on the right hand side of equation (23) is the economic
value of the predation, and this adds to a single species optimum condition in the
same way as a larger rate of discount, decreasing the long-run predator stock. We
find the effects of sanctions from differentiation of equation (23), which yields
∂ X2
*/∂ p1 = –ν r1X1
0/(δ a2/X2
2 *  + 2p2r2/ X1
0) < 0 (24)
∂ X2
*/∂ p2 = – [δ  – r2(1 – 2 2 X*/X1
0)]/(δ a2/ X2
2 *  + 2p2r2/X1
0). (25)
Sanctions on the prey increases the predator stock. The prey is made less valuable,
and this reduces the economic value of the predation, and makes it preferable to har-
vest from a larger predator stock. We conclude that sanctions on the prey make it
optimal for the manager to increase the predator stock. The stock effect from sanc-
tions on the predator is ambiguous. In the nuisance case, [δ  – r2(1 – 2 2 X*/X1
0)] < 0,
sanctions decrease the marine mammal stock, while they increase the stock in the
normal case. In the nuisance case, a positive market value for marine mammal prod-
ucts works to support the stocks of mammals from a one-sided policy for maximum
rent in the fisheries. This situation may occur for small mammal stocks, and now
sanctions will trigger a smaller stock of the marine mammal.
Figure 4 illustrates the phase diagram for the situation with sanctions and a constant
fish stock,  X1
0. The point A illustrates the two-species management solution in equation
(23), B is the situation with no harvesting of the predator, C is the situation with sanc-
tions on the prey, and D is the single species management of the predator stock. Sanc-
tions on the fish products move the optimal solution from A towards D as the value of
the prey decreases; and sanctions on the predator products may move D towards B.
However, our analysis concludes that if the sanctions trigger a situation where
the marine mammal is a nuisance, the effects change completely. If so, it is optimal
to decrease the stock when the price for its products decreases, to protect the valu-
able prey fisheries. In this situation sanctions on the marine mammal shift the opti-
mal  X2
* down and below A in figure 4. This demonstrates the limitations of sanc-
tions. The International Whaling Commission (IWC) management procedure of
1992 is a single species management of each whale stock (Young 1992).7 This
6 The employment policy may also include the employment in onshore processing. If so, even the
catches, and not only the efforts, are arguments in the objective function of the Target.
7 The International Whaling Commission compromised on a management scheme aiming to give a long-
run stock of Minke whales of 72% of the unexploited one. This is higher than the estimated maximum
sustainable yield stock, which is 60% of the unexploited one.Schulz 170
means that the predation effect is excluded, and no sanctions on fish products can
increase the whale stock beyond this point. Hence, D is the maximum whale stock
as long as the Target country continues whaling and the predator products are sold
domestically. Both H1 and H2 decrease when X2 increases in figure 4.
The case with constant effort in the fishery is modeled by setting H1 =  H1
0 in the
general model. Substituting for this in equation (13) yields as a necessary condition





*, p2)[r2(1 – 2 X2
*/X1
*) – ν r2 X2
2 * /X1
2 * ] (26)
= δ b2(X2
*, p2) + ν H1
0r1p1.
Here, the term [r2(1 – 2X2
*/X1
*) – ν r2 X2
2 * /X1
2 * ] = (d/dX2
*)[G(θ (X2
*),  X2
*)] is the re-
stricted marginal change in the growth of the marine mammal. We see from equation
(26) that the management of the marine mammal shall be like a one-species manage-
ment, but with “a larger rate of discount,” reflecting the cost of the predation pres-
sure, ν H1
0r1p1. Differentiation of equation (26) yields (see appendix 1):
∂ X2
*/∂ p1 < 0, and ∂ X2
*/∂ p2 < 0 if {δ  – (d/d X2
*)[G(θ ( X2
*),  X2
*)]} > 0. (27)
In this situation, sanctions on the fish products work, while sanctions on the marine
mammal only work in the situation where {δ  – (d/dX2
*)G[θ (X2
*), X2
*]} > 0, i.e., when
the predator is not a nuisance. If the predator is a nuisance, sanctions will decrease
the stock. In this case, the revenue from selling the marine mammal products makes
it optimal not to deplete the stock according only to the needs of the fisheries.
Figure 5 illustrates this situation, letting X1 be at the line H1 =  H1
0. The point A
is still the two-species optimal solution, while B is the situation with unexploited
predator stock, and C the situation with sanctions on the prey. The point D is the
Figure 4.  Sanctions with a Constant Fish Stock, X1 =  X1
0Trade Sanctions and Marine Mammals 171
single species optimal management of the predator stock.
Still, this management procedure for the predator considers a predation loss,
which is not included in the single species management. We conclude as for the con-
stant prey stock situation that sanctions on the prey work like a decreased δ —mak-
ing the optimal predator stock larger as long as there is positive profit in the harvest-
ing. Sanctions on the predator products also increase the stock in the normal case.
However, in the nuisance case, sanctions on the predator products will move the op-
timum from the point A towards a smaller long-run stock in the figure.
Besides the trade policy two other policy options are easily evaluated. We find
for the two other parameters, R and δ  (see appendix 1):
∂ X2
*/∂δ  = [1/ D ][(π 11 – δ b1x)b2 – b1π 21]. (28)
∂ X2
*/∂ R = [1/ D ][–(π 11 – δ b1x)] > 0 (29)
Equation (28) demonstrates that the well known negative stock effect from increased
rate of discount in the single species case is not obvious in the two-species case. In a
single species management, a decreased rate of discount yields a larger long-run op-
timal stock. A policy intervention which reduces the rate of return from capital will
increase the long-run stock. Flaaten (1988) demonstrates that this is the case for a
prey stock as well, but it is not so for the predator stock. The argument is that when
δ→∞   ⇒   Xi
*→ Xi
∞ . The optimal predator stock may be lower than the open access
one. If so, increased δ  will increase the stock, quite opposite to the single species
effect. Anyway, policy interventions affecting the rate of discount for the manager
will work, and it is probably easy to observe if  Xi
* ≤   Xi
∞ . The effect of an increased
nonconsumptive stock value was found in equation (29) generally to increase the
stock, ∂ X2
*/∂ R > 0.
The optimal single management case, and the optimal management with H1 =
H1
0 or X1 =  X1
0 yield the well known results that ∂ X2
*/∂δ  > 0, ∂ X2
*/∂ R > 0. For an
open access situation, the discount rate or a public goods effect have no influence on
the long-run solution. Table 1 sums up the results of our discussion.
Figure 5.  Sanctions with Constant Harvesting Effort on the Prey, H1 = H1
0Schulz 172
Policy Implications and Concluding Remarks
We have studied the effects of sanctions in predator-prey marine ecosystems and
four different management regimes: open access, optimal management, and two re-
stricted optimal management situations. In the trade conflict both parts have more
than one option, and we need to discuss their choice of policy. The Sender country
has three options: no action, a trade sanction, or a policy which influences the dis-
count rate or the nonconsumptive values of the resources. The Target country can
comply to the pressure and leave the predator unexploited, or resist the pressure and
sell its products with the sanctioned prices.
The short-run rationality will often dominate the Sender country (Hufbauer,
Schott, and Kimberly 1990). If so, only the effects on harvesting are valued, and
trade sanctions on the marine mammal products are always working, while sanctions
on the fish are only an economic punishment of the Target. Sanctions on the prod-
ucts from the fish will only influence the marine mammal stock if there is a link
from the decreased profitability of this harvesting to the profit for the marine mam-
mal harvesting. This occurs through the long-run bioeconomic effects.
The long-run instrumental objective of the Sender country is to increase the ma-
rine mammal stock. However, other objectives may be added. An expressive goal
8 U.S. restricted the import of tuna from Mexico to protect the dolphins—a bycatch in the tuna fisheries.
This policy also included restrictions on other countries which imported tuna from Mexico—an attempt
to influence the world market for tuna (Brack 1996).
Table 1
The Effects of Sanctions on the Size of the Long-Run Stocks
Open Access Optimal Management
Effect on: → Predator Prey Predator Prey
Effect of: ↓ Stock Stock  Stock Stock
Sanctions on Predator Products
Single species management + 0 + ?
Multispecies management + 0 ? ?
and H1 =  H1
0 + – + in normal case – in normal case
– in nuisance case + in nuisance case
and X1 =  X1
0 + 0 + in normal case 0
– in nuisance case
Sanctions on Prey Products
Single species management 0 + + +
Multispecies management 0 + ? ?
and H1 =  H1
0 00 + –
and X1 =  X1
0 00 + 0
Increased rate of discount, δ 0 0 + if  X2
* <  X2
∞ –
– if  X2
* >  X2
∞
Increased nonconsumptive 0 0 + –
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may be to decrease the trade flow in sea products with the Target country. For some
goods this may be part of a policy to harm the Target as well.8 If less bilateral trade
in sea products with the Target country is a specific goal for the Sender, trade sanc-
tions always work. The harvest rate and the harvesting effort may also be part of the
objective function of the Sender. For small stocks the long-run sustainable harvest
rate increases with the stock. This may influence the political pressure for conserva-
tion of stocks, or it may introduce a policy for leaving the marine mammals
unexploited. We concentrate on the demand for increased stock of the marine mam-
mal, and we define the credible threat of sanctions as a situation where this threat
will increase the marine mammal stock regardless of whether the Target complies or
resists the pressure. This means either that the Sender is sure both options will in-
crease the marine mammal stock, or that the Sender has enough information to know
that the optimal choice of the Target will increase that stock.
The open access situation leaves no rent for the Target country anyway. If the
Sender launches a threat of sanctions, this will never decrease the marine mammal
stock. If the Target complies to the pressure and leaves the marine mammal
unexploited, we have X2 = X1 in equilibrium and X2 increases compared with the pre-
sanction situation. If sanctions on X1 are added, this will further increase the marine
mammal stock. If the Target country resists the sanction threat, only sanctions on X2
will work, sanctions on the fish products leave the marine mammal stock constant.
Under optimal management, compliance with the sanction threat is to set y2 = 0, X2
= X1 as constraints, and to maximize the present value of the rent from the fisheries.
We find the optimal condition for the fish stock by substituting this in equations (1)
and (2), which yields F(X1) = r1X1[1 – (1 + ν )X1], and we have a one-species man-
agement of the fish stock. Using this in equation (13) gives as a necessary condition





*) = δ b1(X1
*, p1). (30)
Comparing this with the equations (14) and (15) respectively does not leave an un-
ambiguous effect on the marine mammal stock when it is left unexploited. If, for in-
stance, the prey has low value, but still leaves a positive harvesting profit—while
the predator is valuable, the optimal solution with harvesting from both species may
use the prey mainly as food for the predator stock. With the predator left
unexploited, harvesting the prey may still yield some profit, and the depleted prey
stock may reduce the food base and the long-run stock of the predator. However, it
seems reasonable that an unexploited marine mammal stock usually will be larger
than the optimally managed one within the two-species model. In a single species
optimal management regime of the marine mammal stock, or a management with
constant effort or constant stock of the fish, it is obvious that the marine mammal
stock increases when it is left unexploited. Hence, the threat of sanctions is credible
if sanctions work—both resistance and compliance yields a larger marine mammal
stock. However, our analysis does not support that sanctions always work.
Our analysis concludes that sanctions on the predator do not work in two cases.
First, in the general optimal management of the joint sea resources, the effects of
sanctions were undecided. Sanctions decrease the stock of the predator if they are
marginal economic complements, and the predator is a nuisance. Even if the stocks
are marginal economic substitutes, sanctions may not work if the predator is a nui-
sance. And even if the predator is not a nuisance, sanctions may not work if the
stocks are marginal economic complements. These results add new knowledge to
earlier studies. They oppose the conclusions of Flaaten (1989), and they add to gen-
erally ambiguous effects from Flaaten (1991). Second, if the fish stock is managedSchulz 174
with a constant harvesting effort or a constant stock, sanctions do not work if the
predator is a nuisance. These two special cases add new results, and the analysis un-
veils the importance of the marine mammals as a potential economic nuisance in the
resource management.
Sanctions on the prey have quite unpredictable effects on the predator stock. For
small prey stocks, sanctions always work if the species are marginal economic sub-
stitutes. For large optimal prey stocks, sanctions always work if the stocks are mar-
ginal economic complements. For a lot of situations the effect of sanctions is am-
biguous. These conclusions also oppose Flaaten (1989).
In sum, the effects of sanctions depend on the biological and economic interac-
tion of the species, giving no general conclusions. The reason for this is that sanc-
tions on products from one-species change the relative value of the species as nature
assets, and the social manager may prefer to transform some of the biomass to the
most valuable species.
It is obvious that the introduction of a threat of sanctions decreases the expected
total rent from the fisheries. But it is not obvious that the best reaction for the Target
is to stop harvesting the mammal. Resistance gives a lower producer price for one or
both fisheries, while compliance means no rent from the marine mammal, and an in-
creased predation pressure. This affects the present value of the joint nature rent for
the Target country. The Target will choose the management which yields the largest
present value of the rent, and we cannot decide the difference between the two situa-
tions unless we know the specific parameters in the model. The Sender country is
only sure to succeed if both responses yield increased stock of the marine mammal.
This conclusion is important because then the Sender must take the possibility of
resistance from the Target into consideration before launching a threat of sanctions. The
IWC management system from 1992 (Young), seems to support the notion that this is
the best solution the U.S. can reach within a two-species management scheme with
sanctions. The IWC regime also makes it possible for all nations to participate in the
management of the stocks, and it makes the threat of trade sanctions credible.9
Sanctions on the marine mammal products are well known—like the ban of
trade in such products (seal meat and fur, whale oil and meat), or the CITES trade
ban on products from different endangered species. Our analysis demonstrates that
these policy measures have a weak theoretical base. For terrestrial species it is even
worse, since a lower profitability in harvesting may trigger conversion of the habitat
(Schulz 1997c). The same ambiguous results appear from sanctions on the fish
stock. This demonstrates that the U.S. policy of sanctions on fish products against
countries that violate U.S. marine mammal legislation may even decrease the stocks
of marine mammals in the long run. While the single species management models
yield that sanctions work, the more ‘holistic’ approach in a two-species analysis may
change the direction of the sanction effects in the long run.
An easy way for the Target country to make the known effects of sanctions am-
biguous is to insist on a multispecies management, and not informing the interna-
tional opinion on the biological or economic parameters of the model. It must any-
way be important for the Target country to declare that the predation effect of the
marine mammals is considered in the management, because this makes the country less
vulnerable to sanction threats. More surprisingly, it seems that sanctions on the predator
are more likely not to work if the predator is a nuisance. The reason is that the sanctions
harm the market for products from the predator, and leave the stock only as a nuisance.
This means that the Target country is less vulnerable to sanctions when the predator is a
9 The maximal sustainable stock of the marine mammals requires that the prey is left unexploited in the
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nuisance. If a predator is not economically valuable, it is often under threat of deple-
tion caused by its negative influence on other economic activity in the ecosystem.
In an optimal management system a reduced rate of interest works to protect a
single stock, but this policy only works for stocks with profitable harvesting in
predator-prey interaction. We include a nonconsumptive value of the marine mam-
mal stock in the objective function. A policy which increases this value for the man-
ager will always increase the stock. This result demonstrates that a nonconsumptive
value of the marine mammal stock for the international society which is ignored by
the Target country will give a stock that is too small. However, it is possible for the
Sender country to intervene in the management two ways. The market approach is
that a positive international nonconsumptive value of the stock gives a willingness
to pay for the stock internationally. The Sender country may alternatively buy the
property rights to the marine mammal resource, and leave it unexploited.10 For the
Target country this is a favorable deal as long as there is a joint management of both
resources. If not, the owners of the right to exploit the marine mammal will gain,
and leave the costs to the owners of the fish stock. Some marine mammal stocks
may have an unexploited tourist value,11 making it profitable to increase the stock
for eco-tourism (Whelan 1991; Shah 1995). The Sender country may introduce a
market for this value, or subsidize existing activity in eco-tourism.
Throughout the analysis we have used a model which does not permit extinc-
tion, and we assumed that harvesting from the ecosystem would be profitable with both
species present. In the real world, however, there is a danger of extinction. Amundsen,
Bjørndal, and Conrad (1995) show this for a specified production function in an
open access model. Hence, the risk of extinction must be taken into account outside
of our model.
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Appendix
The management problem for overall optimality is given by maximization of equation (13)
with the constraints (6) and (7). The current value Hamiltonian to this problem is H = π  + RX2
+ λ 1[F(X1, X2) – y1] + λ 2[G(X1, X2) – y2] with y1 and y2 as control variables. Flaaten (1988),
building on Clark (1976) finds the equations (14), (15), and dXi/dt = 0 as necessary condi-
tions for long-run equilibrium sustainable stocks.
π 1 = δ b1(X1
*, p1) ⇔  b1(X1
*, p1)F1 + b2(X2
*, p2)G1 + b1x(X1
*, p1)F(.) = δ b1(X1
*, p1) (14)
π 2 = δ b2(X2
*, p2) ⇔  b2(X2
*, p2)G2 + b1(X1
*, p1)F2 (15)
+ b2x (X2
*, p2)G(.) + R = δ b2(X2
*, p2)
where π i = ∂π /∂ Xi. Concentrating on positive stocks we find the comparative statics of the
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and π ij = ∂ 2π /∂ Xi∂ Xj, bi = (pi – ai/Xi), i, j = 1, 2. In optimum π ii < 0, |D| > 0, due to the maximum
conditions (Flaaten 1988). We find ∂π i/∂ p1 = Fi, ∂π i/∂ p2 = Gi, b2p = 1, and (π 11 – δ b1x) < 0. We
substitute for the predator-prey interaction from the equations (1) and (2), F1 = r1(1 – 2X1 –
ν X2), F2 = – ν r1X1, G1 =  r2 X2
2/X1
2, G2 =  r2(1 – 2X2/X1). We also have π 21 =  –ν r1(b1 + b1xX1)
+ (r2X2/X1
2) + (2b2 + b2x X2
2) =  (2p2 – a2/X2)r2X2/X1
2 – p1r1ν . This substitution yields the equa-
tions (19) – (22).
The conditions for  ∂ X2
*/∂ p2 > 0 are discussed in the main text. Here we discuss the effects
of sanctions on the prey, see also Schulz (1994). The signs of  ∂ X2
*/∂ p1 and  ∂ X1
*/∂ p1 in the
equations (21) and (22) are both ambiguous. But for some optimal stock combinations we
can decide the signs of the price effects. In optimum, the joint rent must be nonnegative and
the prey fishery must be profitable [while the predator fishery may be unprofitable (Flaaten
1989)]. In a phase diagram these restrictions together with the assumption of both stocks at
positive long-run sustainable levels make up a set of possible stock combinations as the area
inside the dotted line EB and the lines BC, CG, and GE in figure 3. Along the dotted line
GEB the joint profit is zero. Since | D|  > 0, the sign of the numerator decides the effect of a
price shift. As for ∂ X2
*/∂ p1 in equation (21) the first term of the numerator is [–(δ  – F1)]
p1r1[β (2 2 X
* – X2
∞ )/(X1
*)2 – ν ]. The first part of this term is positive for small values of  X1
*, but
it becomes negative when  X1
* increases. The second part of this term is positive for values of
X2
* above a parabola indicated as AA in figure 3. Since these two parts are multiplicative,
only for stock combinations NW or SE of the point M we get a positive value. The second
term of the numerator is always negative, since ν r1X1 > 0, and in optimum (π 11 – δ b1X) < 0.
Summing up, this makes only two possible areas for a positive value of equation (21). First,
for some optimal values close to the open access long-run equilibria stocks of both species
we may get  ∂ X2
*/∂ p1 > 0. Second, for optimal stock combinations implying a large  X1
*, and
X2
* close to or below  X2
∞ , we may get ∂ X2
*/∂ p1 > 0. These areas are shaded in figure 3, while
∂ X2
*/∂ p1 < 0 is the shade bordered area.
The effects on the prey stock of an own-price increase in equation (22) may be studied in a
similar way. The first part of the first term in the numerator is negative for small values of
X1, but becomes positive when X1 increases. The second part of the first term, (π 22 – δ b2X) <
0, due to the second order conditions for optimum. As for the second term, the first part
(– * ν rXp 1
2
11 ) is always negative, while the sign of the second part was discussed above. Figure
A1 illustrates, for two different sets of parameters, optimal stock combinations where the ef-
fect of an own-price increase may increase the prey stock. The shaded areas illustrate such
stock combinations (Schulz 1994), while the area EBCG still defines the sustainable long-run
stock combinations.
A restricted maximization problem is to set X1 =  X1
0. Now y1 = F(X1
0, X2) = ϕ (X2) = r1 X1
0  (1
–  X1
0 – ν X2), ϕ ´ =  –ν r1X1
0, which must be satisfied in equilibrium. We substitute for this in
equation (13), setting R = 0 for convenience
Figure A1.  Effects on the Prey Stock of an Own-Price Increase
Note: Areas with  ∂ X1






0, p1) ϕ (X2) + b2(X2, p2)y2]e–δ tdt (A2)
dX2/dt = G(X1
0, X2) – y2. (A3)
The Hamiltonian to this problem is H = [b1( X1
0, p1) ϕ (X2) + b2(X2)y2] + λ [G(X1
0, X2) – y2] with
y2 as control variable. We find necessary conditions for maximum when an interior solution
is supposed to be present, by setting dλ /dt = δλ  – ∂ H/∂ X2, ∂ H/∂ y2 = 0, G(X1





*) + b2( X2
*, p2) G2( X1
0,  X2
*) (A4)
= δ b2( X2
*, p2) + b1(X1
0, p1)ν r1X1
0
which with substitution for the predator prey interaction and the Schaefer production func-
tions yields equation (23) in the main text.
The other restricted problem is to set H1 =  H1
0. If so, y1 =  H1
0r1X1 = F(X1, X2) = r1X1(1 – X1
– ν X2), and we also know that the isocline for dX1/dt = 0 will define an implicit function X1 =
θ (X2) = 1 –  H1






{b1[θ (X2), p1] F[θ (X2), X2] + b2(X2, p2)y2}e–δ tdt (A5)
dX2/dt = G[θ (X2), X2] – y2. (A6)
The current value Hamiltonian to this problem is H = {b1[θ (X2), p1] F[θ (X2), X2] + b2(X2,
p2)y2} + λ {G[θ (X2), X2] – y2} with y2 as the control variable. We find necessary conditions for
maximum when an interior solution is supposed to be present, by setting dλ /dt = δλ  – ∂ H/∂ X2,
∂ H/∂ y2 = 0, G[θ (X2), X2] = y2. This yields
X1
* = θ (X2) = 1 –  H1






*, p2)[r2(1 –  2 2 X*/X1
*) – ν rX 22
2 * /X1
2 * ] (22)
= δ b2(X2
*, p2) +  H1
0r1ν [b1(X1
*, p1) + b1X(X1
*, p1) X1
*]
or    (p2 – 2a2/X2
*)r2(1 –  X2
*/X1
*) – (p2 – a2/X2
*)ν r2 X2
2 * /X1
2 *  =  δ (p2 – a2/X2
*) +  H1
0r1ν p1
where r2(1 –  2 2 X*/X1
*) –  ν rX 22
2 * /X1
2 *  = (d/dX2
*){G[θ (X2), X2]} = Ψ  is the restricted marginal
change in the growth of the predator. Differentiation of this system yields
[(2Ψ  – δ )b2X + b2XXG(.) + b2(X2
*, p2)(dΨ /dX2
*)]dX2
* =  (δ  – Ψ )dp2 + ν H1
0r1dp1. (A8)
In optimum it can be demonstrated that b2XXG(.) + 2b2XΨ  + b2( X2
*, p2)(dΨ /dX2) < 0 due to the
second order conditions for optimum, Schulz (1994). This secures that the term in brackets
on the left-hand-side is negative. Hence, we see from equation (A8)
∂ X2
*/∂ p1 < 0, and  ∂ X2
*/∂ p2 < 0 if (δ  – Ψ ) > 0. (27)